This monograph addresses the question, Does one battlefield framework fit all environments? The 1993 version of FM 100-5, OPERATIONS, prescribes the deep, close, and rear (DCR) battlefield framework. Evidence presented in this monograph suggests that this battlefield framework, DCR, is not suitable for commander and staff utilization in planning, visualizing and executing command and control during certain operations. It is of the utmost importance that commanders and staffs employ suitable battlefield frameworks during planning of military operations in order to develop potential solutions to problems. US Army leaders must possess the skills, tools and doctrinal flexibility to determine future battlefield frameworks. This monograph looks at the current military operating environment in order to understand the missions to which the Army will deploy. It conducts a review of the history and doctrine of battlefield frameworks. Alternative battlefield frameworks are considered followed by an analysis of each. Finally, this monograph summarizes the findings of this research project. The significant conclusion of this monograph is that one battlefield framework does not fit all environments. Therefore, future doctrine should teach the characteristics of optimal battlefield frameworks in order to best assist commanders and staffs in visualizing, planning, and executing command and control.